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Supreme Court Review
present facts no limitations were put on this prima facie authority.
Interpreted broadly, the ratio of this case could be that any limitations
on authority which are to render a note unenforceable within Section
32 must be expressed. This view, I submit, is desirable as it would
add certainty to commercial transactions, an element much appre-
ciated by the business community. In effect, by this view, a holder
of a blank note need fill it in only in accordance with express conditions
stated and need not worry that a court would draw inferences of
limited authority from surrounding circumstances. D.R.O'C.
K. PATENTS
Boehringer Sohn v. Bell-Craig Ltd., [1963] S.C.R. 410.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in C. H. Boehringer
Sohn v. Bell-Craig Limited, [1963] S.C.R. 410, 25 Fox Pat. C. 36 is
of considerable importance in determining the form of claims to be
employed in applications for patent made under Section 41 (1) of the
Patent Act. That section provides as follows:
In the case of inventions relating to substances prepared or produced
by chemical processes and intended for food or medicine, the specifica-
tion shall not include claims for the substance itself, except when pre-
pared or produced by the methods or processes of manufacture particular-
ly described and claimed or by their obvious chemical equivalents.
In other words, in patents of the type referred to there can only
appear what are known as process-dependent claims.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that an applicant for a patent
can not satisfy the requirements of Section 41(1) of the Patent Act
for a claim for a substance by the filing of a broad process claim
for the production of a whole genus of which a substance is one, if
the claim, because of its generality, is found to be invalid. The Court
pointed out that the subsection was intended to place a strict limita-
tion upon claims for substances by chemical process and intended for
food or medicine. As provided in the subsection such a substance
can not be claimed by itself. It can only be claimed when produced
by a particular process of manufacture. The applicant for patent
must claim not only the substance but that process by which it is
manufactured. Therefore, in order to comply with the subsection he
must make two claims. He must make valid claims to both the pro-
cess and the substance if he is to be entitled successfully to claim the
latter. The Court further held that to interpret the subsection as
meaning that all that is necessary is to file a claim for the process,
valid or not, would be to defeat its purpose.
It will thus be seen that when a substance prepared or produced
by a chemical process and intended for food or medicine is claimed,
it must be claimed by reference to a claim for the process by which
it is produced and that process claim must be valid. The applicant
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must be under the necessity, if he wishes to claim the substance, of
framing two claims each of which must be valid. It is apparent that
a claim to such a substance can not be supported by a process claim
which is invalid.
The Court discussed its previous decision in the Commissioner of
Patents v. Winthrop Chemical Company Inc., [1948] S.C.R. 46, 7
Fox Pat. C. 183. In that case it was held that a claim for a substance
alone can not, under section 41 (1) of the Patent Act, be entertained
and the applicant's specification should describe the method or process
by which the substance is prepared or produced and claim a patent
therefor in the manner specified in the Act. The Court pointed out
and held that the reasoning of the Winthrop case was authority not
only for the precise point before the Court in that case, namely, that
an applicant for a patent for a substance under section 41(1) must
make a specific process claim, but was applicable also to the issue
before the Court in the present case, namely, that there can not be
a valid patent for a substance within that subsection if the process





In four cases the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the
law on the principle of compensation in expropriation procedures.
Two of these were appeals from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the
other two came from the Exchequer Court (both involving Her
Majesty in right of Canada).
In all these cases the basic issue was-"the value of the land".
The variations between the amounts of compensation sought by the
owner and those offered by the expropriating authority, recommend-
ed by the proper administrative tribunal, or eventually awarded by
the courts are a constant source of amazement to the layman and to
the lawyer alike.
Mr. Justice Abbott delivering the majority judgment in Standish-
Hall Hotel Inc. v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 64 at 71 says: " .... in a
case such as this the tribunal of fact must first determine in accord-
ance with well established principles the value of the land to the owner
as of the date of expropriation.. ." (emphasis added). This statement
is most reassuring, yet disconcertingly only in one out of the four
cases did the Supreme Court render a unanimous judgment. The aver-
age student or practitioner might well wonder what well established
principles Abbott J. is talking about.
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